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Abstract
Decision-making under normative uncertainty requires an agent to aggre-
gate the assessments of options given by rival normative theories into a single
assessment that tells her what to do in light of her uncertainty. But what if
the assessments of rival theories differ not just in their content but in their
structure—e.g., some are merely ordinal while others are cardinal? This paper
describes and evaluates three general approaches to this “problem of struc-
tural diversity”: structural enrichment, structural depletion, and multi-stage
aggregation. All three approaches have notable drawbacks, but I tentatively
defend multi-stage aggregation as least bad of the three.
1 The problem of structural diversity
How should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain about basic norma-
tive principles—for instance, uncertain whether Kantianism or utilitarianism is the
correct moral theory? This question has become the focus of a substantial and grow-
ing philosophical literature (initiated by Lockhart (2000), Ross (2006a,b), Guerrero
(2007), and Sepielli (2009, 2010), among others). Most of the approaches to choice
under normative uncertainty that have been proposed in this literature involve some
form of intertheoretic aggregation—some method of combining assessments of op-
tions delivered by rival normative theories into a single assessment that tells the
agent what to do in light of her uncertainty. The paradigm example of an intertheo-
retic aggregation rule is “maximize expected choiceworthiness” (MEC), which takes
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a probability-weighted sum of the choiceworthiness (value, rightness, etc.) of each
option according to each normative theory, and instructs the agent to choose an
option for which this sum is maximal.1 But several other aggregation rules have
been suggested in the literature, including “My Favorite Option” (MFO), which
tells agents to choose the option that is most likely to be maximally choicewor-
thy or permissible,2 various ordinal aggregation rules borrowed from voting theory
(Nissan-Rozen, 2012; MacAskill, 2016), and stochastic dominance (Tarsney, 2018b).
Any approach to intertheoretic aggregation, however, faces the following chal-
lenge: Normative theories can disagree not just in the content but also in the struc-
ture of their assessments. For instance, some theories assess options on an interval or
ratio scale, while others merely preorder options as more or less choiceworthy, while
still others simply classify options as permissible or impermissible. It often seems,
though, that the aggregation rules that are most appropriate for assessments with
one kind of structure are clearly inappropriate—or simply inapplicable—to assess-
ments with another kind of structure. For instance, MEC is inapplicable to theories
that merely preorder options. On the other hand, MFO is applicable to theories
that provide cardinal assessments, but seems clearly suboptimal, since it takes no
account of that cardinal information. How, then, can we aggregate the assessments
of theories with diverse structures, if no single aggregation rule is well-suited to all
possible structures? I will call this the problem of structural diversity.
The problem of structural diversity has been recognized in the literature on
normative uncertainty (e.g. by Sepielli (2010, pp. 38ff) and MacAskill (2014, pp. 117–
122)) and, as we will see, several philosophers have implicitly or explicitly advanced
solutions to it. These proposed solutions, however, have serious drawbacks, and
1Expectational principles (stated variously in terms of expected value, expected rightness, or
expected choiceworthiness) have been defended by Lockhart (2000), Ross (2006a) , Sepielli (2010)
, MacAskill (2014) , Riedener (2015) , and MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming) , among others.
2This rule is discussed (but not endorsed) by Lockhart (2000) and Gustafsson and Torpman
(2014), among others.
2
have mainly tried to address one special case: the aggregation of theories with
simple cardinal and ordinal structures. In this paper, I aim to offer a more general
and systematic treatment that both demonstrates the scope of the problem and
evaluates potential solutions more thoroughly than has so far been attempted.
In §§2–3, I introduce the problem of structural diversity more carefully, arguing
in particular that the variety of possible structures a normative theory can exhibit—
and hence the scale of the challenge for intertheoretic aggregation—is much greater
than has so far been acknowledged. In §4, I survey a wide range of possible responses
to the problem, of which I will focus on three: structural enrichment, structural
depletion, and multi-stage aggregation. In §§5–7 I consider each of these approaches
in turn. While all three have serious drawbacks, I conclude with a tentative defense
of multi-stage aggregation as the least bad approach on offer.
2 What is a “structure”?
What is the “structure” of a normative theory—or, more importantly for our pur-
poses, what does it mean to say that two theories have “the same structure” or
“different structures”? It is surprisingly difficult to give a general, precise, and ex-
tensionally reasonable answer to this question. But in this section, I’ll try to say—
albeit in a very rough-and-ready way—how we might understand these notions, in
order to provide a framework and point of reference for later sections. Along the
way, I’ll introduce some useful terminology and notation.
First, a few basic concepts: An assessment is some normative evaluation, rank-
ing, scoring, etc, of a set of practical options. It is normative in the sense that it
pertains to an agent’s reasons—e.g., it says how much reason an agent has to choose
a given option, or whether she has more/less/equal/incomparable reason to choose
one option as compared to another. I choose the term “assessment” (rather than,
say, “ranking”) because it does not connote any particular structure, and hence does
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not prejudge the question of what structures a normative theory can exhibit.
An aggregation rule is a function or procedure that takes as input two or more
assessments of the same set of options, with probabilities or other weights attached,
and delivers as output a single assessment of those options that represents a weighted
combination of the input assessments. Aggregation rules are distinct from deci-
sion rules, in that the output of aggregation need not represent a final, all-things-
considered prescription—it may incorporate only some of the decision-relevant con-
siderations or possibilities in a given choice situation.
A theory is a maximal consistent set of assessments in terms of some normative
concept, like objective reasons, moral obligation, or utility. Different kinds of theories
correspond to different normative concepts. In this paper, our primary interest will
be in first-order normative theories (hereafter simply “normative theories”) like
Kantianism and utilitarianism. These theories assess options based on what we may
call “empirical-belief-relative” reasons—that is, their assessments are sensitive to
an agent’s empirical beliefs, but not (directly) sensitive to her normative beliefs.
What makes them theories is that they leave no room for further assessments of the
same kind—they purport to settle all questions concerning empirical-belief-relative
reasons.3
Our primary focus will be on the process by which the assessments of normative
theories are aggregated to generate the assessments of metanormative theories—i.e.,
theories of choice under first-order normative uncertainty. Metanormative theories
like MFO or MEC assess options in terms of what we might call “fully subjective”
reasons, which take account of the agent’s normative as well as empirical beliefs. I
will assume that these metanormative assessments are rational assessments—that
3Though I use the word “theory,” I mean to include both “theoretical” and “anti-theoretical”
normative worldviews. Even the most anti-theoretical picture of the normative world can be
expressed as a maximal consistent set of assessments—those assessments will just be relatively
piecemeal, difficult to axiomatize, perhaps involve widespread incomparability, etc.
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is, that we are ultimately interested in the question of how to act rationally in the
face of normative uncertainty.4
It will be useful to describe theories a little more formally. A normative theory
Ti can be represented as an ordered quadruple 〈O, σi, Ii, fi〉. O is the set of all
possible practical options. Each option O ∈ O can be understood as a vector
of non-normative properties, specified indexically in relation to an agent (e.g., “is
believed [by the agent] to violate a promise”). σi is a set of normative properties and
relations (e.g., “is more choiceworthy than”), and Ii is an interpretation function
that specifies the extension of those properties and relations within O. Finally, fi is
a choice function mapping each non-empty subset S ⊆ O (a choice situation) to a
non-empty subset of itself (the choice set of theory Ti in choice situation S), in a
way that supervenes on the σi-properties and relations of the options in S.
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We are now ready to give a serviceable, though lamentably imprecise, character-
ization of the sort of “structural diversity” that poses a challenge for metanormative
theorizing. First, say that aggregation rule R applies to normative theory Ti iff, in
all (or nearly all) choice situations, it is possible for R to yield a non-trivial output
assessment given inputs assessments that include Ti’s. For instance, MEC applies to
simple cardinal theories since, under otherwise favorable conditions, it can take their
assessments as input and generate a non-trivial output assessment (an assessment
4This framing of metanormative questions in terms of rationality is common in the literature
on normative uncertainty, but not uncontroversial. For a defense, see Bykvist (2013). For the rival
view that decision-making under normative (or at least moral) uncertainty is essentially a moral
question, see Rosenthal (2019).
5I gloss over some difficult questions here: e.g., by what non-normative properties should
possible options be individuated? And should σi include only “primitive” normative properties
and relations, or should it include all formulae that can be constructed (with some specified set of
logical tools) from those primitive properties and relations? I don’t have fully worked-out answers
to these questions, but I set them aside since, as far as I can tell, they don’t impinge too much on
the central questions of this paper.
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that makes distinctions between the options being assessed). But it does not apply
to a theory that merely preorders options, since a position in a preorder is not the
sort of thing that can be multiplied by a probability, so attempting to apply MEC
will yield an output assessment that is simply undefined for every option.
Next, say that aggregation rule R is sensitive to theory Ti if its output assess-
ments are sensitive to the information provided by Ti’s input assessments. That is,
if there are σi-properties or relations that systematically make no difference to R’s
output assessments, then R is—at least to some extent—insensitive to Ti. So, for
instance, MFO applies to theories that provide cardinal information, but is largely
insensitive to those theories in that it is insensitive to the information they provide
concerning how much a given option falls short of maximal choiceworthiness.
Finally, say that theory Ti is covered by aggregation rule R iff R applies and is
sensitive to Ti. And say that two theories T1 and T2 have relevantly similar structure,
relative to a set of aggregation rules R, iff there is no aggregation rule in R that
covers T1 and not T2, or vice versa.
Though quite rough, this notion of structural similarity does what we want—it
identifies the specific challenge that the structural diversity of normative theories
poses to metanormative aggregation. In particular, it reflects the fact that whether a
given form of structural diversity poses an obstacle to aggregation depends on which
aggregation rules we find antecedently plausible in a metanormative context. The
problem of structural diversity, we might say, is the problem of how to aggregate the
assessments of rival theories under normative uncertainty, given that most plausible
aggregation rules cover only some of the theories in which an agent might have
positive credence.
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3 What structures are possible?
Having said at least roughly what it means for normative theories to differ in their
structure, the next question is: In what specific ways can normative theories differ
in their structure? And in particular, in what ways do plausible normative theories
differ in their structure, that affect the coverage of plausible aggregation rules?
In the literature on normative uncertainty, insofar as the problem of structural
diversity has been acknowledged, the focus has been on the distinction between
ordinal and cardinal theories—typically on the assumption that an expectational
aggregation rule is appropriate for all cardinal theories, that ordinal theories are
the major alternative, and that ordinal theories should either be required to satisfy
axioms that allow them to be represented as cardinal (Ross, 2006b; Sepielli, 2010)
or else aggregated by a distinct aggregation rule (MacAskill, 2016; Tarsney, 2019).6
But this dramatically understates the challenge of structural diversity. To see
the scope of the challenge, it is worth briefly considering some of the potentially
aggregation-relevant ways in which the structure of normative theories might differ.
For instance...
• The cardinal structure of the real number line can be extended in various
ways to accommodate the possibility of infinite or infinitesimal values. A
6The terms “ordinal” and “cardinal” are useful but imprecise. I use them as follows: A theory
has simple ordinal structure if it totally preorders options in terms of relative choiceworthiness.
A theory has ordinal structure more generally if it preorders options in terms of relative choice-
worthiness or some other binary normative relation. A theory has simple cardinal structure if it
assigns each option a degree of choiceworthiness from a one-dimensional preordered vector space
of choiceworthiness values isomorphic to the real numbers. A ratio-scale theory is a simple cardi-
nal theory whose choiceworthiness assignment is unique up to positive linear transformation. An
interval-scale theory is a simple cardinal theory whose choiceworthiness assignment is unique only
up to positive affine transformation. A cardinal theory more generally is any theory that assigns
to options degrees of choiceworthiness or some other normative property that are arranged in any
preordered vector space (which generalize the structure of the real numbers).
7
theory that recognizes the possibility of infinite value but does not distinguish
degrees of infinite value has a value scale with the structure of the extended real
number line (the real numbers together with the special elements +∞,−∞).
Alternatively, if we want to distinguish degrees of infinite value, or allow for
infinitesimal value, we might entertain a theory whose choiceworthiness scale
has the structure of the hyperreal or surreal numbers.7
• A theory’s choiceworthiness scale might have more than one dimension. For
instance, it might represent degrees of choiceworthiness by two-dimensional
vectors, lexicographically ordered (i.e., (x1, y1) ≥ (x2, y2) ⇔ (x1 > x2 ∨ (x1 =
x2 ∧ (y1 ≥ y2)).8 Such a two-dimensional structure could also be used to
represent incomparable values, with the overall ordering being the intersec-
tion quasi-ordering of the total orderings given by the two dimensions (i.e.,
(x1, y1) ≥ (x2, y2) ⇔ (x1 ≥ x2 ∧ y1 ≥ y2)). Either of these structures could
be extended to arbitrarily many dimensions. And the various dimensions of
a multidimensional choiceworthiness scale could themselves display various
structures, e.g. ordinal, interval, ratio, extended reals, hyperreals, etc.
• At the other end of the scale of complexity, a theory could simply have what we
might call binary structure: classifying options as permissible or impermissible,
but making no normative distinctions among permissible options or among
impermissible options. This could be the structure, for instance, of an extreme
libertarian view according to which morality consists entirely of negative side
constraints, which it is never permissible to violate, and such that all options
7Chen and Rubio (forthcoming) propose a normative theory with a surreal-valued utility func-
tion. Bostrom (2011) describes, without endorsing, a hyperreal-valued axiology, meant to enable
utilitarian comparison of worlds with infinite populations. Several other approaches to infinite
axiology (e.g. Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), Arntzenius (2014)) extend the utilitarian value scale
beyond the real numbers in other, less canonical ways.
8This sort of theory is discussed by MacAskill (2014, pp. 47–50).
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that do not violate side constraint are equally choiceworthy.
• Finally, philosophical expositions of “commonsense” morality should plausibly
exhibit an internal diversity of structure, sometimes making precise interval-
or ratio-scale comparisons (e.g., when our options involve providing a fixed
material good to different numbers of people); sometimes making such com-
parisons only imprecisely (e.g., when comparing aesthetic values, or allocating
health resources in a diverse population), perhaps with features like “parity”
(Chang, 2002); and sometimes invoking constraint-like considerations that,
even if non-absolute, cannot be treated as mere multiples of ordinary conse-
quentialist considerations (e.g., the prohibition on punishing the innocent). It
seems unlikely that commonsense morality, or any modest refinement thereof,
can be represented by anything so straightforward as a total preorder or a
real-valued choiceworthiness function on the set of all possible options.
Is there any order underlying this chaos of possible structures? Maybe not,
but the following strikes me as a plausible hypothesis: What is essential to any
normative theory is binary structure—more specifically, the identification of some
set of options in each choice situation as permissible or “eligible for choice.”
Universal Binary Structure (UBS) The essential task of normative theories is
to classify options in particular choice situations as permissible or impermissi-
ble. So a normative theory can have any structure that is capable of inducing
such a binary classification—perhaps with the added constraint that at least
one option in each choice situation is always permissible.
I already implicitly introduced this hypothesis in the last section, by allowing norma-
tive theories to recognize an arbitrary set of normative properties and relations, but
requiring that every theory include a choice function mapping each choice situation
to a choice set of permissible options.
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UBS is motivated by the idea that the essential job of any normative theory is
to guide agents’ choices, i.e., to tell us what to do.9 If this is right, then nothing
can count as a normative theory that does not make the binary distinction between
permissible and impermissible options.10 But the diversity of possible structures
explored above is explained by the many possible extensions of binary structure:
any structure that can induce a binary classification of options (or, in the language
of the last section, any set of normative properties and relations on which a binary
classification of options can supervene) is a possible structure of a normative theory.
And this means, more or less, any structure whatsoever.
The most obvious alternative to UBS is:
Universal Ordinal Structure (UOS) The essential task of normative theories is
to compare and rank options in particular choice situations. So a normative
theory can have any structure that is capable of inducing an ordinal ranking—
that is, a preordering—of options in terms of choiceworthiness.
It’s not entirely obvious that UBS and UOS are genuinely rival hypotheses. On
the one hand, any theory with ordinal structure can induce a binary classification
in which just the maximally choiceworthy options are permissible (at least for finite
option sets). And on the other hand, any theory with binary structure can induce
at least a degenerate, choice-set-dependent ordinal ranking (where, in each choice
9Of course, particular normative theories are not fully action-guiding in that they don’t tell an
agent what to do in light of her normative uncertainties. But the assessments given by normative
theories play an essential role in action guidance, both as inputs to a final, fully action-guiding
assessment, and insofar as an agent who is certain of a particular normative theory must be able
to derive action guidance from its assessment alone.
10This claim is most plausible if “permissible” and “impermissible” are understood very thinly:
e.g., an option O is permissible in situation S according to theory T iff it is possible for an agent
who believes T with probability 1 to choose O in situation S, without thereby exhibiting akrasia or
any other failure of practical rationality. Even normative theories that eschew traditional deontic
notions plausibly define choice sets of options that are permissible in this thin sense.
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situation, the permissible options are all equally choiceworthy, the impermissible
options are all equally choiceworthy, and the permissible options are more choice-
worthy than the impermissible options). But UOS is more demanding than UBS if it
is read as requiring that normative theories uniquely define a choice-set-independent
ranking of all possible options, or a choice-set-dependent ranking that can involve
arbitrarily many ranks.
Adjudicating between UBS and (various precisifications of) UOS would require
a lengthy discussion which I will not attempt here. As we will see, which hypothesis
we accept has some bearing on questions we will discuss later—in particular, it tells
us something important about what structural depletion views (and multi-stage
aggregation views involving structural depletion) are committed to. So it is useful
to have the two hypotheses on the table. But which hypothesis we accept will not
make an essential difference to the arguments that follow.
Most importantly, whichever hypothesis we accept, we reach the conclusion that
normative theories can display an enormous range of structures. If UBS is true, then
they can display any extension of binary structure, which means, in effect, almost
any structure imaginable. If UOS is true, the range of possible structures might be
somewhat more constrained, but still goes far beyond simple ordinal, interval, and
ratio scales (to include, e.g., the sort of multidimensional and infinitary structures
described above). A general theory of rational choice under normative uncertainty
must be able to accommodate this diversity. The balance of this paper will consider
how that might be done.
4 Responses to structural diversity: a survey
In this section, I will briefly survey a long list of possible responses to the problem
of structural diversity, before identifying three particularly interesting responses
that we will explore in more depth in the following sections. The long list can
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be divided into three categories: Non-aggregation views are theories of decision-
making under normative uncertainty according to which we are never required to
aggregate the assessments of multiple normative theories, and therefore don’t need to
worry about structural diversity as an obstacle to aggregation. Aggregation without
structural diversity tries to legislate the problem away by allowing aggregation only
within structurally homogeneous sets of theories. Finally, aggregation with structural
diversity confronts the problem head on, looking for methods of combining rankings
of options with arbitrarily diverse structures.
Non-aggregation views
1. First-order normative externalism: According to this view, there is no in-
teresting sense in which what an agent ought to do directly depends on her
normative beliefs or uncertainties. Rather, an agent should simply act on the
true normative theory, even if she has no way of knowing what the true nor-
mative theory is and even if her evidence strongly supports some other theory.
Versions of first-order externalism have been defended by Weatherson (2014,
2019), Harman (2015), and Hedden (2016). But this view is subject to pow-
erful (and in my view, decisive) objections—see for instance Sepielli (2016,
2018), Podgorski (forthcoming) , and MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming, pp.
3–6).
2. “My Favorite Theory” (MFT): In its simplest form, this view says that an
agent should always act on the single normative theory to which she assigns
greatest credence. Versions of MFT have been defended by Gracely (1996) and
Gustafsson and Torpman (2014). But MFT is also subject to very powerful
objections, at least in the forms in which it has so far been articulated—see
for instance MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming, pp. 6–9).
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Aggregation without structural diversity
3. My Favorite (Structurally Homogeneous) Class of Theories: The most powerful
criticism of the version of MFT defended by Gustafsson and Torpman (2014) is
that it individuates theories so finely that an agent may distribute her credence
over hundreds or thousands of theories, and the single theory in which she has
greatest credence may still only command some tiny portion of her credal
distribution. Elsewhere, I have suggested that a more plausible version of
MFT might instruct an agent to act on the class of mutually comparable
theories to which she assigns greatest credence Tarsney (2017, pp. 215–7). If
shared structure is a prerequisite for intertheoretic comparability, then this
view would sidestep the problem of structural diversity: although it requires
agents to aggregate the verdicts of multiple theories to decide what to do, it
requires such aggregation only within classes of structurally uniform theories.
But this view seems more than a little ad hoc, and has yet to find any advocates
in the literature.
4. Epistemic structural externalism: On this view, there is some privileged struc-
ture such that agents are rationally required to have positive credence only in
normative theories that possess that structure, or can be represented as pos-
sessing that structure. Someone might take this view, for instance, if they
find the von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) axioms so compelling that they
think it is irrational to have any positive credence in normative theories whose
rankings of risky options don’t satisfy those axioms. Since theories that sat-
isfy the VNM axioms can be represented as maximizing the expectation of a
cardinal choiceworthiness function, all theories that satisfy these axioms are,
plausibly, similar enough in their structures to enable intertheoretic aggrega-
tion. Though to my knowledge this “structural externalist” view has not been
explicitly advocated in the normative uncertainty literature, it could be seen
as implicit in Ross (2006b, p. 763) or Sepielli (2010, pp. 173–180).
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5. Practical structural externalism: On this variant of the structural externalist
view, while one is rationally permitted to have positive credence in views that
lack the privileged structure, one is rationally required to ignore that credence
for purposes of decision-making, and to take as inputs to practical reasoning
only one’s credence in theories that possess the privileged structure. This view
seems less plausible than its epistemic cousin, and to my knowledge has not
been defended in the literature.
Finally, there are the views that confront structural diversity head on, devis-
ing methods for aggregating theories whose structures differ in aggregation-relevant
ways. Since these approaches will be the focus of the coming sections, I introduce
them only briefly for now.
Aggregation with structural diversity
6. Structural enrichment: To aggregate structurally diverse theories, we should
add structure to the more sparsely structured theories, until their structure
is relevantly similar to that of more richly structured theories. For instance,
we might “cardinalize” ordinal theories by turning their ordinal rankings into
Borda scores, allowing them to be aggregated with theories that already pos-
sess cardinal structure by an expectational aggregation rule (MacAskill, 2014).
7. Structural depletion: To aggregate structurally diverse theories, we should
simply ignore all but some minimal, universal structure that all normative
theories have in common (e.g., binary or ordinal structure), and use aggrega-
tion rules that apply to theories with only that minimal structure but that
may be relatively insensitive to theories with richer structure. For instance,
we might ignore all but the binary structure of each theory and aggregate
by means of MFO, or ignore all but the ordinal structure of each theory and
aggregate by means of some non-scoring voting method (Nissan-Rozen, 2012).
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8. Multi-stage aggregation: To aggregate structurally diverse theories, we should
first aggregate classes of structurally similar theories by aggregation rules that
cover each class, then take the outputs of those aggregations as inputs to
further stages of aggregation that combine dissimilar structures by means of
enrichment and/or depletion.
This list of options is certainly not exhaustive. Among other things, it leaves
out various possible combinations of (1)–(8), like a combination of (6) and (7) that
regiments all theories to an intermediate structure by enriching some and depleting
others. But it includes what seem like the main contenders and, to my knowledge,
all the answers to the problem of structural diversity that have been implicitly or
explicitly forwarded in the literature.
In the rest of the paper, I will focus on options (6)–(8), the approaches that
take the phenomenon of structural diversity seriously and devise aggregation rules
to cope with it. My primary reason for this focus, of course, is that it’s where
the interesting problem of structural diversity lies—if we adopt a view that makes
the problem disappear by fiat, then there is not much left to say about structural
diversity per se. But in addition, options (1)–(5) all have significant drawbacks. The
debates over (1) and (2) (first-order externalism and MFT) are too large to enter into
here, but the objections in the recent literature (cited above) seem quite powerful.
(3)–(5) have yet to be considered in any depth, and so are harder to assess. (3)
clearly inherits some, though not all, of the drawbacks of (2) (and feels less natural
and parsimonious). There may be room for a plausible version of (4) (I am less
optimistic about (5)), but it has yet to be developed. And at least prima facie, the
vigorous and longstanding debate over structure-determining axiom systems like
VNM counts against the view that doubting these axioms is proof of irrationality.
So, on the plausible though not incontestable assumption that rational decision-
making should be sensitive to an agent’s uncertainties about basic normative ques-
tions, including uncertainties that cut across theories with relevantly different struc-
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tures, let’s explore the three options that this assumption presents us with: struc-
tural enrichment, structural depletion, and multi-stage aggregation.
5 Structural enrichment
Structural enrichment makes theories structurally compatible, for purposes of aggre-
gation, by imputing additional structure to certain theories. This approach seems to
be implicit in Lockhart’s “Principle of Equity among Moral Theories,” which com-
pares theories by representing every theory as assigning the same (cardinal) value
v+ to its most preferred option in a given choice situation, and the same (cardinal)
value v− to its least preferred option (Lockhart, 2000, p. 84). Lockhart, however,
may simply have assumed that all the theories being compared had cardinal struc-
ture to begin with. The idea of structural enrichment is more explicit in MacAskill
(2014). MacAskill recognizes the existence of merely ordinal theories, and suggests
that the right way to aggregate them is by a kind of weighted Borda count: Very
roughly, we should represent each theory Ti as assigning an integer score to each
option Oj equal to the number of options Ti ranks below Oj, minus the number of
options it ranks above Oj, and then aggregate over theories by taking a probability-
weighted sum of these scores. By extension, MacAskill suggests that the right way
to aggregate ordinal and cardinal theories with one another is to represent the ordi-
nal theories by their (cardinal) Borda scores, and then normalize all of the theories
at their variance—that is, rescale the choiceworthiness assignments of the cardinal
theories, and the Borda scores derived from the ordinal theories, so that the variance
(average squared distance from the mean) of each theory’s assignment is equal to
the same, standard value (e.g., 1).11 We can then aggregate the cardinal and ordi-
11For MacAskill’s defense of the Borda rule, see MacAskill (2016). For his defense of variance
normalization, see MacAskill (2014, Ch. 3). It should be noted that MacAskill (2016) focuses on
cases where an agent has credence only in ordinal theories, so it is only MacAskill (2014) that
defends the Borda method as a form of structural enrichment and a response to the problem of
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nal theories together by simply maximizing expected “choiceworthiness”—or, more
strictly, the expectation of a variable than in some cases (with respect to the cardinal
theories) represents choiceworthiness itself, and in other cases (with respect to the
ordinal theories) represents Borda scores derived from a choiceworthiness ranking.
There are at least three reasons to be skeptical of this approach. First, any form
of structural enrichment seems to involve an element of arbitrariness. For instance,
there are infinitely many ways to “cardinalize” the assessments of an ordinal theory.
And if the theory is genuinely ordinal, then, tautologically, nothing in the content
of the theory itself tells us which cardinalization to choose—they are all equally
compatible with the information the theory does provide, namely its ordinal rank-
ing.12 More generally, beyond the special case of ordinal and cardinal theories, any
form of “enrichment” involves adding information to a theory that isn’t part of the
theory itself—i.e., making things up. Pulling information out of the aether in this
way seems by its nature an arbitrary activity, and not something that rationality
can require us to do in any particular way.
That said, the charge of arbitrariness is hard to make stick. All that is needed
to escape it is some appropriate justification for doing things one way rather than
any other. And purported justifications come cheap—it is possible to produce some
argument in favor of just about any norm. So whether a norm can be convicted of
arbitrariness just depends on whether its purported justifications count as appro-
priate, admissible, or sufficient. And whether a particular justification meets this
threshold is always up for philosophical debate. So I don’t want to rest too much
argumentative weight on the charge of arbitrariness.
The version of structural enrichment that seems to have the best claim to being
structural diversity.
12Formally, say that a function f : O 7→ R represents a preorder < on O just in case ∀(Oi, Oj ∈
O)((Oi < Oj ⇒ f(Oi) ≥ f(Oj)) ∧ (Oi  Oj ⇒ f(Oi) > f(Oj))). For any preorder <, there are
infinitely (indeed, uncountably) many functions that represent it in this sense, and < itself gives
us no guidance as to which function we should prefer.
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uniquely justified—and hence the best shot at beating the charge of arbitrariness—
is MacAskill’s method of Borda scoring plus variance normalization. Borda scores
seem like a particularly natural method of cardinalizing ordinal theories, since they
treat each “step” in a theory’s ranking equivalently (equalizing the distance between
adjacent ranks). More formally, converting ordinal ranks into cardinal values and
maximizing the expectation of those values amounts to aggregation by means of
a scoring rule, and along with its intuitive naturalness, Borda is the only scoring
rule that satisfies certain desirable formal criteria—e.g., never selecting a Condorcet
loser, never ranking a Condorcet winner last, never ranking a Condorcet loser above
a Condorcet winner, and satisfying a certain attractive weakening of Arrow’s Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives.13
Variance normalization likewise has some uniquely attractive properties as a
normalization method: It gives each theory a “say” in decision-making proportionate
to its probability, in the sense that it equalizes the distance of each theory’s vector of
choiceworthiness values from that of the uniform theory (the theory that treats all
options as equally choiceworthy). And it equalizes the expected choiceworthiness,
from each theory’s perspective, of having its assessments included in the aggregation
process with a given unit of probability weight.14
But if the variance-normalized Borda rule is the most natural version of struc-
tural enrichment (uniquely overcoming the charge of arbitrariness), then this is bad
13For a summary of these properties, see MacAskill (2016) and citations therein (especially
Saari (1990)). The Borda rule could also be be defended via the axiomatization in Young (1974).
Another key step in MacAskill’s defense of the Borda rule is that only scoring rules can satisfy
an appealing property he calls Updating Consistency (MacAskill, 2014, p. 75; MacAskill, 2016, p.
990). But as we will see in §7 below, once we consider the full context of decision-making under
normative uncertainty—including interactions between empirical and normative uncertainties and
intertheoretic comparability between cardinal theories—MacAskill’s view as a whole turns out to
violate Updating Consistency.
14For precise statements of these criteria, see MacAskill (2014, pp. 110–116).
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news for structural enrichment, since MacAskill’s method faces serious difficulties.
These difficulties constitute a second objection to structural enrichment, since they
problematize the most appealing version of the view. I have expressed my reserva-
tions about the Borda rule elsewhere (Tarsney, 2019), and will not belabor them
here, but in short: (1) The Borda rule is extremely sensitive to the availability of
irrelevant alternatives, in ways that seem plausible only if we interpret Borda scores
as an imperfect proxy for hidden cardinal information, and not in the context of
genuinely ordinal theories. (2) MacAskill’s method requires that we introduce a
measure on O, but it looks extremely difficult to define such a measure in a princi-
pled and general way without yielding wildly implausible practical conclusions.
Variance normalization has yet to be closely studied, but it also seems to have
some significant drawbacks. First, a theory’s variance (either the variance of a cardi-
nal theory’s choiceworthiness function, or the variance of the Borda scores represent-
ing an ordinal theory’s choiceworthiness ranking) may not be well-defined, even after
the imposition of a measure, and there is no obvious way of generalizing variance
normalization to theories that don’t have a defined variance. Second, variance nor-
malization introduces another source of extreme sensitivity to irrelevant alternatives.
For instance, suppose you are faced with a million options, O1, O2, ..., O1,000,000, and
divide your credence between ten merely-ordinal normative theories, T1, T2, ..., T10.
All ten theories agree that O1−100 are the only real candidates—all theories regard
these hundred options as strictly better than all the rest. But while theories T1−9
give finely discriminating rankings even of the obviously-bad options—not treating
any pair of options O101−1,000,000 as exactly equal in choiceworthiness—T10 is simply
indifferent among all the bad options O101−1,000,000. Under variance normalization,
this indifference among bad options gives T10 near-dictatorial power determine which
of the more reasonable options you will choose: Even if T10 commands a mere one
percent of your credence, the fact that T10 is indifferent among O101−1,000,000 while
T1−9 are not guarantees that the variance-normalized Borda rule will select T10’s
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most preferred option.15
There is an important complication here: the distinction between “broad” and
“narrow” metanormative theories (MacAskill, 2014, pp. 123–5). A broad theory
takes as input each normative theory’s assessment of the set of all possible practical
options, O, and gives as its output a single metanormative assessment of the options
in O that applies to all choice situations. A narrow theory takes as input each
normative theory’s assessment of the options in a particular choice situation, and
gives as its output an option-set-relative metanormative assessment that applies
only to that choice situation. Though many of the same formal worries apply to
both broad and narrow versions of the variance-normalized Borda rule, the force
of those worries varies considerably depending on which version we consider. For
instance, sensitivity to irrelevant alternatives (as in the million-option case above) is
a powerful objection to the narrow view, but arguably unproblematic for the broad
view. On the other hand, the possibility of undefined variance seems remote on the
narrow view, but pressing perhaps to the point of inevitability on the broad view.
There is much more to be said about MacAskill’s approach and other possible
versions of structural enrichment. But there is at least some reason to suspect that
structural enrichment is leading us down a dead end: The most plausible version
of the approach—and the version that has the best claim to rebutting the charge
15A similar problem arises with cardinal theories: Suppose you are faced with ten options,
O1−10, and divide your credence between ten normative theories, T1−10. O1−9 are all reasonable
options, while O10 is clearly terrible—every theory considers it the least choiceworthy option. T1−5
regard O10 as merely very bad—its shortfall relative to the best option is ∼ 10 times greater than
that of the second worst option. But T6−10 regard O10 as abominable—its shortfall relative to the
best option is ∼ 1010 times greater than than of the second worst option. Variance normalization
implies, in this case, that T6−10 should get almost no say in determining which of your reasonable
options, O1−9, you choose, simply because of this disagreement about exactly how bad the obviously
bad option O10 is. As in the ordinal case, variance normalization seems to make our choices
implausibly sensitive to clearly irrelevant considerations.
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of arbitrariness—faces a thicket of technical challenges, and it is at best unclear if
they can all be overcome.
A third and final objection to structural enrichment is that it’s hard to generalize.
As I emphasized in §3, the two cases that have received the most attention to
date—simple cardinal and simple ordinal theories—are just two particularly salient
members of a much larger set of possible structures, and a solution to the problem of
structural diversity must have something to say not just about these two structures,
but about structural diversity in general. But it’s hard to imagine any general
principle of structural enrichment (e.g., a generalization of Borda counting/variance
normalization) that would tell us what to do with multidimensional theories, various
infinite value structures, theories involving intransitivities or option-set dependence,
etc. Really following through on the structural enrichment approach may require a
hodgepodge of ad hoc devices to handle all the aggregation-relevant ways in which
one theory’s structure can outstrip another’s.
These objections are far from conclusive—it’s possible that the variance-normalized
Borda rule, or some other form of structural enrichment, can be developed in a way
that mitigates the worries I’ve described. And as we will see, the alternatives to
structural enrichment have problems of their own. But these worries reinforce a
more basic suspicion that structural enrichment simply does not take theories at
face value. In imposing alien structure on theories, and inventing information where
none exists to populate that structure, it seems like an ad hoc solution to the prob-
lem of structural diversity that does not take seriously agents’ credence in theories
with genuinely sparse structure. So it is worth considering alternative approaches.
6 Structural depletion
The second approach, structural depletion, takes the opposite tack. Rather than
“leveling up” sparsely structured theories to make them compatible with more richly
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structured theories, it instead “levels down” the more enriched theories. More pre-
cisely, structural depletion does not edit the structure or content of theories in order
to make a preferred aggregation rule applicable, but rather adopts an aggregation
rule that applies to every theory from the outset, because it is insensitive to all but
the minimal, universal structure that all theories have in common.
What aggregation rules are available to the proponent of structural depletion
depends on what structure we take to be universal. If UBS is correct (i.e., if the
only universal structural feature of normative theories is the binary classification
of options as permissible or impermissible), then structural depletion demands an
aggregation rule that takes only binary information as its input. This limits the pro-
ponent of structural diversity, more or less, to MFO: An agent should aggregate the
assessments of her normative theories simply by summing up the probabilities that
each option is permissible, and choosing an option for which this sum is maximal.16
If UOS is correct (i.e., if the minimal structure all normative theories have in com-
mon is ordinal rather than binary), then more aggregation rules are available—in
particularly, various non-scoring (i.e., non-cardinalizing) voting rules borrowed from
social choice theory (Nissan-Rozen, 2012; Tarsney, 2019).17
16Other options open to the proponent of structural depletion, given UBS, include (i) a “thresh-
old” view, on which an agent may choose any option that has a probability greater than t of being
permissible (or, if no option exceeds threshold t, then an option with maximal probability) or (ii) a
“satisficing” view, on which an agent may choose any option whose probability of being permissible
is close enough to maximal. These views might be motivated by the intuitive over-demandingness
of MFO in cases where several options carry only a very small risk of being impermissible.
17MFO can itself be regarded as a probability-weighted voting rule, somewhere in between
simple plurality and approval voting: Each theory gives a yes/no vote on each option, and the
option with the greatest weighted sum of “yes” votes wins. Each theory can in principle vote
“yes” on any number of options (as with approval voting), but only does vote yes for options it
regards as permissible. Insofar as most theories will regard only maximally choiceworthy options as
permissible, and will judge in most choice situations that only one option is maximally choiceworthy
(both non-obvious assumptions), MFO might in practice be more like simple plurality voting (where
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As with structural enrichment, I will raise three interrelated worries about struc-
tural depletion—worries that apply to both binary and ordinal versions of the ap-
proach.
First, structural depletion throws away what seems like eminently decision-
relevant information—in particular, it mishandles cases where cardinal intertheo-
retic choiceworthiness comparisons are possible. Suppose an agent, Alice, is faced
with two options, O1 and O2. She is almost sure that some version of maximizing
consequentialism is true. Conditional on that assumption, she is sure that hedonic
experience has moral value, but unsure whether there are also non-derivative aes-
thetic values. She also has non-zero credence in a non-consequentialist theory that
provides merely ordinal information. She thus divides her credence between three
normative theories: a hedonistic and a pluralistic version of consequentialism, and
a version of non-consequentialism.
As I have argued elsewhere (Tarsney, 2018a), it is natural in a case like this to
think that, insofar as the two consequentialist theories are in complete agreement
about hedonic value and only disagree about the existence of aesthetic value, their
cardinal choiceworthiness scales should be normalized at the value of a hedon—
i.e., by treating the theories as assigning the same value to a given unit of hedonic
experience.18 And if we spell out the content of the theories in a sufficiently fine-
grained way, we can make a compelling theoretical case for this normalization as
well (see in particular Appendix B of Tarsney (2017)).
Let’s suppose that, given this normalization, the judgments of the three theories
can be represented as in Table 1. The notable feature of the case is that, while the
two consequentialist theories are equally probable and disagree about which option
is more choiceworthy, the pluralistic theory T2 regards the choice as much higher-
each voter is allowed only a single “yes” vote).
18Similar claims about this sort of case have been made by Ross (2006b, pp. 764–5) and
MacAskill (2014, p. 134).
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Theory Credence Assessment
T1 (hedonism) .49 CW(O1) = 0, CW(O2) = 1
T2 (pluralism) .49 CW(O2) = 0, CW(O1) = 100
T3 (non-consequentialism) .02 O2  O1
Table 1: Alice’s choice, before depletion
Theory Credence Assessment (ordinal/binary)
T1 (hedonism) .49 O2  O1 / f1({O1, O2}) = {O2}
T2 (pluralism) .49 O1  O2 / f2({O1, O2}) = {O1}
T3 (non-consequentialism) .02 O2  O1 / f1({O1, O2}) = {O2}
Table 2: Alice’s choice, after depletion
stakes than the hedonistic theory O1. Given this information, it seems clear that
Alice should choose O1: She is nearly certain that some consequentialist norma-
tive theory is correct, she is able to make intertheoretic comparisons between the
consequentialist theories in which she has positive credence, and given those com-
parisons, O1 has vastly greater expected choiceworthiness than O2 (conditional on
some version of consequentialism being true).
But any version of structural depletion—whether binary or ordinal—is commit-
ted to choosing O2. If we strip away everything but the binary/ordinal information,
we are left with the information given in Table 2. Here we have nothing left to go
on besides the facts that (i) O2 is more likely than O1 to be permissible, (ii) O2 is
more likely than O1 to be maximally choiceworthy, and (iii) it is more likely that
O2  O1 than that O1  O2. All of these facts, of course, favor O2 over O1. By
ignoring cardinal information for the sake of simplifying the aggregation process,
therefore, we are forced to ignore an extremely compelling reason to choose O1.
Second, because it ignores cardinal information, structural depletion is vulner-
able to diachronic inefficiencies. Consider, for instance, the following sequences of
choice situations. Each situation involves two options, assessed by three equiprob-
able theories T1−3, each with simple cardinal structure. (For simplicity, let Tn(Oi)
24
designate the cardinal value that Tn assigns to Oi.)
• S1 = {O1, O2}: T1/T2(O1) = 1, T1/T2(O2) = 0, T3(O1) = 0, T3(O2) = 10
• S2 = {O3, O4}: T2/T3(O3) = 1, T2/T3(O4) = 0, T1(O3) = 0, T1(O4) = 10
• S3 = {O5, O6}: T3/T1(O5) = 1, T3/T1(O6) = 0, T2(O5) = 0, T2(O6) = 10
Any version of structural depletion seems committed to choosing options O1
in S1, O3 in S2, and O5 in S3. O1, for instance, is the option most likely to be
permissible in S1, most likely to be maximally choiceworthy, and more likely to be
more choiceworthy than O2 than to be less choiceworthy, so it defeats O2 according
to any ordinal social choice method that satisfies minimal neutrality criteria. And
the case for O3 and O5 is exactly the same. This sequence of choices, however,
yields total payoffs of 2/2/2 according to theories T1/T2/T3, respectively, whereas
choosing options O2, O4, and O6 would have yielded payoffs of 10/10/10 according
to T1/T2/T3, respectively. That is, structural depletion commits the agent to a
sequence of choices that is worse than an available alternative sequence, according
to every theory in which she has positive credence.19
Two points are worth noting: First, this objection does not depend on any
assumption of intertheoretic comparability. We can rescale the choiceworthiness as-
signments of each theory however we want and the point remains, that choosing
O1/O3/O5 is certainly worse than choosing O2/O4/O6.
20 Second, this is a “forced”
inefficiency: Structural depletion does not merely permit but requires the agent to
choose the certainly-suboptimal sequence of options. This makes for a much more
compelling objection, inter alia because there is no hope of avoiding the problem by
19A related diachronic inefficiency objection to MFO is described by Gustafsson and Torpman
(2014, pp. 165–6).
20The argument does depend on the stipulation that T1−3 all regard the choiceworthiness of a
sequence of options as the sum of the choiceworthiness of the individual options making up the
sequence. Theories need not evaluate sequences of options in this way, but it’s clearly possible.
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supplementing a structural depletion approach with principles of diachronic ratio-
nality that let us avoid sure losses—any such principle would contradict, not extend,
a metanormative view based on structural depletion.21
Both structural enrichment and (as we will see) multi-stage aggregation ap-
proaches can avoid this sort of inefficiency, by taking account of the cardinal infor-
mation provided by T1−3. This does not necessarily mean that these approaches will
recommend the sequence O2/O4/O6. Rather, their recommendations will depend
on how we normalize T1−3. If, for instance, the correct normalization preserved the
prenormalized choiceworthiness values for T1−2 given above, but multiplied T3’s val-
ues by 100, then an expectational aggregation rule would recommend the sequence
O2/O3/O5. But however we normalize the theories, we will not end up choosing the
inefficient sequence O1/O3/O5.
Third and finally, structural depletion seems committed to drawing a fundamen-
tal line between normative and empirical uncertainties. A thoroughgoing structural
depletion view of decision-making under uncertainty in general might claim, for
instance, that one should always choose an option with a maximal probability of
being maximally choiceworthy in a fully fact-relative sense, i.e., in a sense that takes
no account of one’s normative or empirical beliefs. But this decision theory would
imply, for instance, that if I suspect someone has poisoned my coffee, I should go
21The only version of structural depletion that might be able to avoid this objection, as far as
I can see, is an approach that (i) takes ordinal rather than binary information as input and (ii)
adopts the “broad” approach of imposing a single metanormative ranking on the set of all possible
options and instructing agents to choose, in a given choice situation, an option that is maximal
among their available options in that ranking. On this approach, how any given social choice
method would rank, for instance, options O1 and O2 would depend on assumptions about the
content of the set of all possible options (and, since this set is presumably infinite, would depend
on a choice of measure on the set). This makes it very hard to figure out what such a view would
recommend in any given choice situation, including S1−3 above—which is, of course, a significant
objection in its own right to such a view. In any event, no one in the literature has tried to develop
a view of this sort, so I set it aside as a possibility for future research.
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ahead and drink so long as the probability that my cup contains deadly poison is
a mere .49, rather than a prohibitive .51. No one, to my knowledge, is prepared to
defend such a view. So the proponent of structural diversity must instead advocate
a view on which we account for cardinal information when dealing with empirical
uncertainty (e.g., to compute the expected choiceworthiness of an option according
to a given normative theory), but then discard that information as soon as we are
dealing with normative uncertainty—even when our normative uncertainties concern
theories that provide us with usable cardinal information, as in the case of Alice.
While there is lively debate over just how continuous normative uncertainty is with
empirical uncertainty (see for instance Weatherson (2014, 2019), Tarsney (2017, pp.
57–66)), treating the two kinds of uncertainty differently when we are not forced to
is at least prima facie inelegant and undermotivated.22
22Most of the arguments that have been offered in the literature for making a fundamental
distinction between normative and empirical uncertainty are meant to support the conclusion
that an agent’s normative beliefs are simply irrelevant to what she subjectively ought to do (e.g.
Weatherson (2014, 2019), Harman (2015), Hedden (2016)). These arguments offer scant support for
the view that agents ought to account for their normative uncertainties, but in a more structurally
impoverished way than they account for their empirical uncertainties.
One possible basis for the kind of distinction drawn by structural depletion views is the claim
that intertheoretic comparisons are generally impossible (Gracely, 1996; Gustafsson and Torp-
man, 2014; Nissan-Rozen, 2015; Hedden, 2016). But even if true, this claim does not force us
to accept structural depletion and ignore cardinal information under normative uncertainty. We
could instead, for instance, adopt a statistical normalization method (like variance normaliza-
tion) or a bargaining-theoretic approach to normative uncertainty (Greaves and Cotton-Barratt,
unpublished), both of which preserve sensitivity to cardinal information without presupposing
intertheoretic comparability.
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7 Multi-stage aggregation
This leaves us with the approach I have called multi-stage aggregation. On this
approach, we first aggregate classes of structurally similar theories by aggregation
rules appropriate to each class, then take these aggregations as inputs to further
stages of aggregation that combine dissimilar structures by means of enrichment
and/or depletion.23
It’s useful to consider an example. Suppose that Betty divides her credence
between four theories: the two consequentialist theories described in the last section
(hedonistic utilitarianism and a pluralistic theory that recognizes both hedonic and
aesthetic value) and two ordinally structured deontological theories that disagree
about whether one ought to kill innocent threats in other-defense, but are otherwise
in complete agreement. Betty must decide whether to kill Carl: Carl was innocently
driving his truck down a city street when his brakes failed, having been sabotaged
by some nefarious malefactor. His truck is now careening unstoppably toward five
innocent people trapped in a narrow alleyway. The only way to save the five is for
Betty, perched on a nearby rooftop, to destroy Carl’s truck with a bazooka. In the
truck with Carl, however, are a dozen priceless works of art and the only score of
a newly rediscovered Beethoven symphony. If Betty opens fire, both Carl and his
truckload of aesthetic goods will be destroyed, but five innocents lives will be saved.
The death of an innocent person, let’s assume, amounts to a loss of 20 hedons,
while the loss of the artistic contents of Carl’s truck would amount to a loss of 10
hedons.24 However, their destruction would also amount to a loss of 200 aesthetons
(a unit of aesthetic value that, on Betty’s pluralistic theory, has the same value
23This approach was first described—but, as we will see, not endorsed—by MacAskill (2014, p.
118), who calls it a “multi-step procedure.”
24Suppose that, although people will derive enjoyment from these works, that enjoyment is
highly substitutable, so that if Carl’s truck is destroyed, the would-be appreciators of the artworks
it contains would be able to derive nearly as much pleasure from other works.
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Theory Credence O1 (kill) O2 (don’t kill)
T1 (hedonism) .3 −30 −100
T2 (pluralism) .3 −230 −100
T3 (Kill IT’s.) .25 permissible impermissible
T4 (Don’t kill IT’s.) .15 impermissible permissible
Table 3: Betty’s choice, Stage 1
as a hedon). So while Betty’s hedonistic theory (T1) supports killing Carl to save
the five, her pluralistic theory (T2) opposes it. Of Betty’s deontological theories
(T3−4), meanwhile, one claims that killing Carl is permissible and doing nothing is
impermissible, while the other claims that doing nothing is permissible and killing
Carl is impermissible. Table 3 represents each theory’s assessment of the situation.
Multi-stage aggregation could in principle proceed in either of two directions:
(1) aggregating the most richly structured theories first, and depleting the result
to facilitate further stages of aggregation, or (2) aggregating the most structurally
impoverished theories first, and enriching the result to facilitate further stages of
aggregation. I will focus on (1), which as far as I can see is the more promising
approach. On this approach, we first aggregate T1 and T2. These theories have the
same simple cardinal structure and (let’s assume) the aggregation rule appropriate
to them is MEC. The expected choiceworthiness of O1, relative to the set of theories
{T1, T2}, is (.3×−30)+(.3×−230) = −78, and the expected choiceworthiness of O2
is (.3×−100) + (.3×−100) = −60.25 So, as far as Betty’s consequentialist theories
are concerned, she should choose O2 (i.e., not kill Carl).
But how do we aggregate these consequentialist theories with the deontological
theories T3 and T4? What multi-stage aggregation commits us to is aggregating
T1 and T2 with these less-structured theories as a pre-aggregated unit, rather than
25It will make no difference to our final conclusions whether we use the agent’s unconditional
credences or her credences conditional on the class of theories being aggregated (that is, conditional
on T1 ∨ T2). For simplicity, I use the unconditional credences.
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Theory Credence O1 (kill) O2 (don’t kill)
C1 (consequentialism) .6 impermissible permissible
T3 (Kill IT’s.) .25 permissible impermissible
T4 (Don’t kill IT’s.) .15 impermissible permissible
Table 4: Betty’s choice, Stage 2
individually. For simplicity, let’s assume that T3 and T4 have merely binary struc-
ture. In this case, we should take the pre-aggregated class of theories C1 = {T1, T2},
along with the theories T3 and T4, as inputs to a binary aggregation rule. Table
4 represents this second stage of this aggregation procedure. If, as I have claimed,
the appropriate aggregation rule for binary-structured theories is MFO, then since
Betty’s aggregate credence in views according to which O1 is permissible is .25,
while her aggregate credence in views according to which O2 is permissible is .75,
we conclude that she should not kill Carl.
Note that the two-stage procedure we have just described is not equivalent to
MFO simpliciter : According to MFO, Betty should choose an option such that the
sum of the probabilities of individual normative theories that assess it as permissible
is maximal. In Betty’s case, this means choosing O1: The theories that prescribe
O1, viz. T1 and T3, command a combined credence of .55 while the theories that
prescribe O2, viz. T2 and T4, command a combined credence of only .45. Multi-stage
aggregation instead selects O2 because it is sensitive to the cardinal information
provided by T1 and T2: Although T1 (which prescribes O1) and T2 (which prescribes
O2) are equally probable, the stakes are higher according to T2, and hence the pair of
theories on balance support O2 over O1. This information is ignored by single-stage
MFO, but is reflected in the output assessments of a multi-stage procedure.
The prima facie appeal of multi-stage aggregation is that it’s responsive to the
information provided by more richly structured (e.g., cardinal) theories, without
artificially imposing that structure on less-structured (e.g., ordinal) theories. In
Betty’s case, this means that the cardinal values assigned by T1 and T2 can make
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a difference to our practical conclusions, without the need to implicitly or explic-
itly cardinalize the non-cardinal theories T3 and T4. In other words, multi-stage
aggregation avoids the first two objections to structural depletion—it accounts for
cardinal information when it’s available, and thereby can avoid the sort of diachronic
inefficiency described in the last section—while also avoiding the first objection to
structural enrichment, by not arbitrarily inventing information to fill out structurally
impoverished theories.26
But like structural enrichment and depletion, multi-stage aggregation is open to
serious objections. I’ll first consider a pair of closely related objections, and sketch a
version of multi-stage aggregation intended to mitigate them. I will then introduce
a third objection, which requires more extended discussion.
The first two objections are as follows: First, multi-stage aggregation introduces
an unacceptable element of arbitrariness, in that its outputs depend on an “order of
aggregation.” More precisely, multi-stage aggregation requires that we organize nor-
mative theories into something like a nested hierarchy, that tells us which theories
or sets of theories should be aggregated with each other at each stage of the aggre-
gation process; the output of multi-stage aggregation can depend on which nested
hierarchy we choose; and—the objection goes—any choice of nested hierarchy is at
least partially arbitrary. Second, for this reason and because of the variety of aggre-
gation methods it potentially involves, multi-stage aggregation results in a decision
procedure that is implausibly complex—in particular, too complex to represent a
basic requirement of rationality. Unless it can be shown that the chaos of multi-stage
26Importantly, structural enrichment and multi-stage approaches avoid the sort of inefficiency
described above only if they make intertheoretic comparisons in a way that is consistent across
choice situations. To do this, they must either (a) find some non-statistical basis for intertheoretic
comparisons (like agreement on a certain category of value or class of choice situations), or (b),
if they rely on statistical normalization methods, adopt a scope that is broader than single choice
situations (e.g., equalizing the range or variance of each theory’s choiceworthiness function over a
broad domain like all possible options or all the options faced by a particular agent in her lifetime).
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aggregation—perhaps indefinitely many stages of aggregation, with potentially very
different aggregation rules being applied to different classes of theories at the lower
levels—has some underlying, unifying idea that explains and justifies it, we should
reject the approach simply on grounds of parsimony.
These are serious objections, at least to certain forms of multi-stage aggregation.
In fact, I initially inclined toward a multi-stage view that involved a potentially
indefinite number of stages, but changed my mind after thinking through the pitfalls
involved in defining such a complex order of aggregation. Fortunately, however, there
is a more straightforward version of multi-stage aggregation that at least mitigates
worries about arbitrariness and complexity. Here is a sketch of the view.
The Two-Stage View
• The basic motivating idea behind this view is that rational choice should be
based on, and responsive to, all and only the decision-relevant information
available to the agent. That is, we should not throw away relevant information
but, equally, should not invent information where none exists.
• Respecting this imperative requires a multi-stage procedure because, roughly,
the correct response to certain information is to apply an aggregation rule
that is inapplicable when that information is not available. For instance, some
theories assign cardinal and intertheoretically comparable degrees of choice-
worthiness to options; the correct way of accounting for this information is to
take a probability-weighted average; but this aggregation rule is inapplicable,
e.g., to merely-ordinal theories. Any single aggregation rule, therefore, will
either require us to ignore (or at least respond inadequately/incorrectly) to
relevant information from more richly structured theories, or else to invent
information in order to apply more structurally demanding aggregation rules
to less-structured theories.
• The solution to this dilemma is as follows: First, associate each normative
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theory with an optimal aggregation rule—a rule that represents the optimal
response to the decision-relevant information provided by that theory.27 Sec-
ond, aggregate sets of theories that share the same optimal aggregation rule,
using that rule. Finally, using whatever aggregation rule is optimal for theories
with only the minimal structure essential to all normative theories (whether
that is binary or ordinal), aggregate the theories for which this is the optimal
aggregation rule, together with the results of the first stage of aggregation.
The two-stage view largely assuages worries about arbitrariness and complexity.
First, the order of aggregation does not look particularly arbitrary: We aggregate
sets of theories that share the same optimal aggregation rule, then aggregate all
theories, regardless of their optimal aggregation rule. Second, the resulting decision
procedure need not be particularly complex—its complexity will depend on how
many different aggregation rules we think are optimal for at least some theories.
And whatever complexity results is well motivated by the simple underlying idea
that we should respond as best we can to the decision-relevant information provided
by the theories in which we have positive credence.28
27What makes an aggregation rule optimal for a given theory is up for debate: It might depend
simply on the structure of the theory, with the optimal aggregation rule representing the optimal
response to the sort of information provided by theories with that structure. But it might also
depend on the decision-theoretic content of the theory itself—e.g., the aggregation rule the theory
endorses for responding to empirical uncertainty or, if theories are characterized richly enough to
contain such information, the aggregation rule it endorses for dealing with normative uncertainty.
28Indeed, the two-stage view is arguably simpler than other, putatively single-stage views in
the literature. Most extant views, as we will see below, first aggregate over empirical possibilities
conditional on each normative theory, before aggregating over normative theories. If the optimal
aggregation rule for a normative theory is just the rule that it uses for aggregating over empirical
possibilities, then the two-stage view lets us aggregate over both empirical and normative possi-
bilities at the first stage of the two-stage procedure. This amounts to moving from a two-stage
procedure that draws a line between normative and empirical uncertainties, to one that draws a
line between uncertainties within, and those between, classes of normative theories that share the
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But there is another, more pointed objection to the multi-stage approach. As
MacAskill has pointed out (MacAskill, 2014, pp. 117–9), any version of multi-stage
aggregation seems likely to violate an intuitively compelling axiom he calls Updating
Consistency.
Updating Consistency For any choice situation S, theory Ti, and option O, if
O is maximally choiceworthy of the options in S according to Ti, and O is
maximal in the metanormative assessment of S, then if the agent increases
her credence in Ti while keeping the ratios between her credences in all other
theories the same, creating a new choice situation S ′, O is still maximal in the
metanormative assessment of S ′.
MacAskill describes a case where any multi-stage aggregation procedure seems
committed to violating Updating Consistency, which I have reproduced in Table
5. Suppose, in this case, that the cardinal theories T2 and T3 are intertheoretically
comparable. If we first aggregate these two theories expectationally, we get a ranking
in terms of expected choiceworthiness, O3  O2  O1, which covers 5/9 of the
agent’s credence. When we then aggregate this ordinal ranking with that given by
T1, any reasonable method should conclude that O3 is the preferred option.
But now suppose that the agent reduces her credence in T2 to zero, and increases
her credence in T1 and T3 to 4/7 and 3/7, respectively. Then, by the same sort of
reasoning, we find that O1 is the preferred option. So decreasing one’s credence in
a theory that views O1 as the most choiceworthy option, while keeping the ratios
between one’s credences in all other theories the same, can cause O1 to rise in the
metanormative assessment.
Against this objection to multi-stage aggregation, however, there is a compelling
response: A kind of multi-stage aggregation and—more to the point—the violations
same optimal aggregation rule. And it results in a simpler view insofar as it requires fewer separate
aggregations—rather than separate aggregations for each normative theory, we aggregate at the
first stage over potentially very large classes of normative theories.
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Theory Credence Assessment
T1 4/9 ⇒ 4/7 O1  O2  O3
T2 2/9 ⇒ 0 CW(O1) = 20, CW(O2) = 10, CW(O3) = 0
T3 3/9 ⇒ 3/7 CW(O1) = 0, CW(O2) = 10, CW(O3) = 20
Table 5: Multi-stage aggregation violates Updating Consistency. (Arrows indicate
updates.)
of Updating Consistency that come with it seem nearly unavoidable, once we re-
member that our overall theory of decision-making under uncertainty has to account
for empirical as well as normative uncertainty.
Consider a variant of MacAskill’s case, described in Table 6. In this case the
agent has three options, O1−3, positive credence in a simple ordinal theory T1 and a
simple cardinal theory T2, and positive credence in two (relevantly distinct) empirical
states of the world, S1 and S2. T1 gives the same assessment of the choice situation
regardless of the state of the world, but according to T2, the choiceworthiness of O1
and O3 depends on the state of the world—specifically, if the world is in state S1
then O1 is the best option, but if the world is in state S2 then O3 is the best option.
In this situation, any plausible version of structural depletion and MacAskill’s
own preferred version of structural enrichment both violate Updating Consistency:
Before updating, both views select O3, while after the update—in which the agent
reduces her credence in a possibility, T2 ∧ S1, according to which O1 is maximally
choiceworthy—both views select O1.
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Consider structural depletion. Assuming we don’t adopt the extreme view that
ignores differences in cardinal stakes across empirical as well as normative possibili-
ties, structural depletion tells us to compute T2’s empirical-belief-relative assessment
29Cases like this require probabilistic dependence between normative and empirical beliefs—
otherwise the ratio between the agent’s credences in T1∧S1 and T1∧S2, which I’ve left unspecified,
could not be the same in both choice situations. But this seems entirely possible, albeit unusual.
(For defense of the possibility of this sort of probabilistic dependence, see Podgorski (forthcoming).)
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Theory Credence Assessment
T1 4/9 ⇒ 4/7 O1  O2  O3
T2 ∧ S1 2/9 ⇒ 0 CW(O1) = 20, CW(O2) = 10, CW(O3) = 0
T2 ∧ S2 3/9 ⇒ 3/7 CW(O1) = 0, CW(O2) = 10, CW(O3) = 20
Table 6: Structural depletion and the variance-normalized Borda rule both violate
Updating Consistency, in cases involving both empirical and normative uncertainty.
and then aggregate it with T1’s, using only the binary or ordinal information they
supply. T2’s empirical-belief-relative assessment supplies the ranking O3  O2  O1.
Before updating, this assessment commands greater total probability weight than
T1’s, making O3 the preferred option. After the update, it commands less total
probability weight, so O1 is the preferred option.
With respect to the variance-normalized Borda rule, things are roughly the same.
Once again, we begin by computing T2’s empirical-belief-relative assessment. Both
before and after updating, these expected values are equally spaced.30 So when
we convert T1’s ranking to Borda scores and variance-normalize the Borda scores
derived from T1 with the empirical-belief-relative expectations of T2, we end up
simply choosing the option preferred by the more probable normative theory. Before
updating, this is O3 (preferred by T2); after updating, it is O1 (preferred by T1).
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Both structural depletion and the best-developed version of structural enrich-
ment, therefore, imply that reducing your credence in one theory, T2 ∧ S1, while
keeping the ratios between your credences in all other theories the same, improves
the metanormative assessment from the perspective of that theory.
The way to escape these violations of Updating Consistency, for proponents of
30Before updating, the probability-weighted sum of choiceworthiness values given by T2 is 40/9,
50/9, and 60/9 for O1/O2/O3, respectively. After updating, the values are 0, 30/7, and 60/7.
31Note that variance normalization alone is enough to generate violations of Updating Consis-
tency in cases like this—for instance, if we replace T1 with a cardinal theory according to which
CW(O1) = 2, CW(O2) = 1, and CW(O3) = 0. So abandoning Borda for another method of
enrichment won’t solve the problem.
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either structural enrichment or structural depletion, is to endorse a genuinely single-
stage aggregation rule for both empirical and normative uncertainty. This seems like
a clear non-starter for structural depletion. For a proponent of structural enrich-
ment, things are a bit more complicated. A natural move is to simply take a single
expectation over normative-plus-empirical possibilities. This has the downside of
ignoring the aggregation rules that theories themselves endorse for responding to
empirical uncertainty—e.g., ignoring some theories’ non-neutral attitudes toward
risk. If, say, a theory tells me that when I’m uncertain about the empirical state of
the world, I should maximize a risk-weighted expectation of utility, value, or choice-
worthiness (Buchak, 2013), using the risk function r(x) =
√
x, then the theory’s
empirical-belief-relative assessments will reflect that risk aversion, but a simple ex-
pectation over normative-plus-empirical possibilities will not. (For an interesting
attempt to mitigate this problem, see Dietrich and Jabarian (unpublished).)
But additionally, this move by itself will not allow us to respect Updating Con-
sistency, unless we are able to make intertheoretic comparisons entirely without
recourse to statistical methods like range or variance normalization. The option of
using these statistical methods comprehensively to normalize the assessments given
by each normative-plus-empirical possibility is, I assume, a non-starter: If, say, we
variance-normalize the choiceworthiness values associated with the possibilities (i)
“hedonistic utilitarianism is true, and it will rain tomorrow” and (ii) “hedonistic
utilitarianism is true, and it won’t rain tomorrow,” we would generally conclude
that the normative significance of a hedon according to hedonistic utilitarianism
depends on whether or not it will rain tomorrow. So we must instead normalize
assessments associated with the same normative theory in a more natural, “content-
based” manner (e.g., assuming that hedonistic utilitarianism assigns the same value
to a hedon regardless of the state of the world), reserving statistical methods like
range or variance normalization for comparisons between normative theories.
Similarly, if we think that some normative theories are naturally comparable
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Theory Credence Assessment
T1 3/10 ⇒ 0 CW(O1) = 1, CW(O2) = 0, CW(O3) = −109
T2 4/10 ⇒ 4/7 CW(O1) = 1, CW(O2) = 0, CW(O3) = 0
T3 3/10 ⇒ 3/7 CW(O1) = 0, CW(O2) = 1, CW(O3) = 0
Table 7: Combining statistical and content-based normalization methods results in
violations of Updating Consistency.
(e.g., the hedonistic and pluralistic versions of consequentialism introduced in §6)
while others are not (e.g., total and average utilitarianism), we will naturally want
to normalize sets of comparable theories according to the true comparisons between
them (e.g., assuming that hedonism and pluralism agree on the value of a hedon),
while reserving statistical methods for normalizing incomparable theories. This
means that we normalize classes of comparable theories with other, incomparable
theories based on their collective variance (or some other statistical feature).32
But such a mixture of normalization methods itself results in violations of Up-
dating Consistency. Consider the case described in Table 7, involving three simple
cardinal theories, where T1 and T2 are comparable with each other, but not with T3.
(We can assume either that T1 and T2 are distinct normative theories like hedonism
and pluralism, or that they represent conjunctions of the same normative theory
with different empirical possibilities.)
Since T1 enormously inflates the collective variance of {T1, T2}, it leaves these
theories with almost no influence over the choice between O1 and O2, allowing
T3’s preference for O2 to win out. But if the agent reduces her credence in T1
to zero while increasing her credence in the other two theories proportionately (as
shown in the table), the situation is reduced to an aggregation of the symmetric
rankings of T2 and T3, and since T2 is the more probable theory, O1 is now the
preferred option.33 Notably, this means that MacAskill’s view violates Updating
32This is the approach endorsed by MacAskill (2014, pp. 119–121).
33I assume here that we compute the collective variance of a set of mutually comparable theories
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Consistency even with respect to purely normative uncertainty, before we consider
interactions with empirical uncertainty. We get the same result if we use other
statistical properties (e.g., range) to normalize {T1, T2} with T3.
The only way I can see for a structural enrichment view to avoid violations
of Updating Consistency, therefore, is to avoid any recourse to statistical meth-
ods like variance normalization, by claiming that all theories are comparable by
more natural methods, just as closely related theories like hedonism and pluralism
appear to be. But this is an ambitious and prima facie very implausible claim.
Apart from apparent incomparabilities between simple cardinal theories like total
and average utilitarianism, this approach would have to claim that there are natu-
ral, non-statistical bases for comparison between, say, the Borda scores derived from
the rankings of an ordinal theory and the cardinal choiceworthiness values given by
a simple cardinal theory. But it’s very hard to see how we could make this sort
of comparison by anything other than statistical methods. I conclude, therefore,
that whatever the intuitive appeal of Updating Consistency, it is unlikely that any
plausible metanormative theory will be able to satisfy it.
Thus, the most serious known drawback of multi-stage aggregation seems to be
an endemic defect of metanormative theories, which cannot be plausibly avoided by
structural enrichment or structural depletion. While I haven’t given a comprehensive
or even a full-throated defense of the multi-stage approach, therefore, it seems to
me that the objections it faces are more tractable than the objections to structural
enrichment or structural depletion, and that multi-stage aggregation is therefore the
most promising approach to structural diversity.
in a probability-weighted manner, rather than giving equal weight to every possible theory in the
set. The latter approach seems infeasible, since there will generally be infinitely many possible
theories in any such set, and without probability weights, their collective variance will be undefined.
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8 Conclusion
Developing an adequate theory of decision-making under normative uncertainty has
proven to be an enormously challenging project. It is natural and appropriate, when
we first confront such a challenge, to help ourselves to large simplifying assumptions
that make the problem more tractable. Thus, the recent literature on normative
uncertainty has mostly assumed either that normative theories all share the same
structure, or that they exhibit only a narrow range of structures. But I have tried
to show that important considerations come into view when we set aside these
simplifying assumptions. The range of possible normative structures is much broader
than has generally been acknowledged, and so the problem of structural diversity
requires a general approach, not one that is merely tailored to the special case of
simple ordinal and cardinal theories. Finding such a general approach is not easy—
all the obvious candidates have serious drawbacks. And the choice is consequential:
The fortunes of particular metanormative views, like My Favorite Option or the
Borda rule, may turn on the success or failure of the more general approaches to
structural diversity that they exemplify.
I have focused on three approaches to structural diversity—structural enrich-
ment, structural depletion, and multi-stage aggregation—and argued that multi-
stage aggregation is the least bad of the three. But even if this is right, it still
leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, could a hybrid approach that
combines two or more of the views surveyed in §4 improve on the approaches we
have considered, capturing the advantages of the views it combines while avoiding
their disadvantages? And how complete was the survey in the first place—are there
other approaches to structural diversity, qualitatively distinct from those I’ve sur-
veyed and from any hybridization thereof? Finally, to what extent do analogous
problems arise in other domains that involve aggregation of assessments with poten-
tially diverse structure (e.g., preference or belief aggregation in populations where
some individuals but not others satisfy axioms that allow for unique cardinal rep-
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resentations), and what can we learn from these analogies? I leave these questions,
among others, for future research.
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